




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept., JCS reviews completed.



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) Santo Domingo remains quiet with no political solution in sight.

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[The interior of the country is calm, although [] the Marxist-Leninist Dominican Popular Movement is continuing to plan uprisings in various towns throughout the country. [] the rebel government is making preparations for a mass meeting to be held in Santiago today. The Santiago area is tranquil and loyalist police and military forces are in control, but the people are reportedly confused by the prolonged political machinations in the capital.]

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[In Santo Domingo, members of the Dominican Communist Party are concerned that the Caamano government is "being softened to the extent that it will be willing to make any agreement." They have decided that the people must be awakened to resist through the party newspaper and through popular demonstrations. Female members of the pro-Castro 14th of June Movement are taking advantage of the military lull to continue spreading Communist doctrine culled from Radio Habana broadcasts.]

A special emissary sent by Venezuelan President Leoni on a fact-finding mission told Ambassador Bennett yesterday that he is now convinced that Communists are in fact playing an active role in the Caamano government, despite the official Venezuelan position to the contrary.

Alejandro Izaguirre, who was Venezuelan ambassador in Santo Domingo during the Bosch administration, added that Caamano would probably agree to


a settlement, but that "strong" elements in the rebel movement would fight to the end. With respect to Imbert, Izaguirre stated that he is a "good person," but that his political movement is "fictitious" and his conviction that he is the savior of his country will make any conciliation of the present dispute prolonged and difficult. [REDACTED]

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NORTH VIETNAM



*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

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Missile Sites in North Vietnam: Another new surface-to-air missile site--the third--was detected in the Hanoi area in photography on 24 May. The new site is located about 13 nautical miles east southeast of Hanoi and about 15 miles from the first site.


The newest site apparently will be like the other two, with six launch positions. Four launch revetments appear to be well along in construction. One other launch position is in the early stages of construction while work on the sixth position was apparently just being started on 24 May. Thus far, possible missile associated equipment has only been detected at one site.

Air Strikes in North Vietnam: On 26 May US Air Force F-105 fighter-bombers, forced by weather to divert from the Hoai An ammunition depot, attacked the Hon Matt Island radar site. The radar site was extensively damaged, according to pilot reports. The Vinh POL site was also struck on 26 May with four buildings reported damaged and several fires started.

US Navy aircraft struck the Phu Van supply depot, one of a number of installations in the Phu Van complex northwest of Vinh, and succeeded in destroying seven or eight buildings and damaging nine others. Navy aircraft were hampered by weather in their strike against the Vinh railroad classification yard and were able to make only one attack. Pilots estimated that the attack was successful although no sightings were made.

A large number of day and night armed reconnaissance missions were flown against roads and rivers south of the 20th parallel. The most significant targets attacked were three heavily camouflaged patrol type boats in the river near Thanh Hoa. Repeated attacks damaged all three boats with one apparently out of control after taking a direct hit with a Bullpup air-to-ground missile. Additionally, at least 10 secondary bridges were damaged, most of them slightly, and one truck was destroyed and three others damaged.

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The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Viet Cong activity generally continues to emphasize harassment of government outposts and troops and scattered sabotage, but another ambush was reported on 25 May against a three-man US Special Forces team travelling by jeep in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon. One of the Americans was killed, one wounded, and one is missing. Government reinforcements dispatched to the site contacted the Viet Cong, killing 11 of them against government losses of four killed and four wounded.

A government search and destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province yesterday reportedly resulted in losses to the Viet Cong of 23 killed and to the government of six killed and 11 wounded. On the previous day, US marines patrolling near Da Nang killed five Viet Cong and wounded another, and South Vietnamese junk forces, operating around Thua Thien Province, killed four guerrillas and captured three in a successful ambush.

Political Developments in South Vietnam: In Saigon, Premier Quat, after failing so far to shepherd his new cabinet appointments through constitutional obstacles raised by Chief of State Suu, is reportedly prepared for a showdown if Suu continues to withhold approval. Since Suu has so far been unmoved by National Legislative Council support for the premier's authority to revamp his cabinet, Quat may intend to invoke military pressure. Suu's stand is influenced by the incumbent ministers of interior and economy, who he now alleges are threatening to foment demonstrations by dissatisfied southerners and Catholics if they are involuntarily removed from the cabinet.

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*Bolivia: Skillful political maneuvering by junta president Barrientos has temporarily thwarted his opponents.

Using his still powerful influence over the junta cabinet, Barrientos yesterday arranged the appointment of armed forces commander General Ovando as junta co-president. [Barrientos then had himself appointed co-commander of the armed forces. Both men swore an oath of loyalty to each other and to the military government in the presence of cabinet members.]

The reconciliation is hypocritical but was probably imperative in order to prevent a direct confrontation between the two leaders and collapse of the government.

Ovando reportedly has been plotting [with leaders of the rightist Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) and the extreme leftist National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN)] to oust Barrientos. [This unusual party alliance is purely opportunistic.] Barrientos' tactics are aimed at neutralizing Ovando by binding him more closely to the government and forcing him to share his military command. Eventually, Barrientos hopes to remove Ovando from the military post altogether.

Civilian and military relief that a crisis has been avoided appears to be general. Most urban workers have returned to their jobs, although the major tin mines are still on strike. [redacted]

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[redacted] government plans to gain control of the mines have not been abandoned.

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Despite the easing of tensions, Barrientos and Ovando are not likely to desist in their efforts to dominate each other. Not only are they natural competitors, but Ovando is under strong pressure from various parties [the FSB and PRIN] to lead a coup. A final showdown seems inevitable and may only have been postponed for a short time. [redacted]

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Ghana: A major challenge to the Nkrumah regime may come in the near future.

Symptoms of malaise are accumulating. The economic squeeze on ordinary Ghanaians caused by wage ceilings, rising prices, and commodity shortages has intensified in recent months. Moreover, a new pension scheme, involving heavy contributions from employees and employers, and a reduction in the price paid cocoa farmers, the mainstay of Ghana's economy, will go into effect soon.

Last week a riot occurred in an Accra suburb at a rally called by Nkrumah's party to explain a controversial government slum-clearance project. Although the suspected organizers of opposition to the project were arrested, a subsequent official statement has implied that the regime might back down on the matter. If it does so, some of the many other groups with grievances might be encouraged to organize protest demonstrations.

One such disaffected group is the port and railway workers in Takoradi, in western Ghana, who are evidently organizing a strike for next month. Two independent US Embassy sources have indicated that its essential objective would be to bring down the regime, although the overt focus would be on economic issues.

The regime seems likely to be forewarned and may succeed in averting this strike. If the workers actually go out, however, or if some other demonstration should occur, antiregime elements of the military and police might be emboldened to take advantage of the situation to try to remove Nkrumah.

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EFTA: [The "summit" meeting of the European Free Trade Association, held in Vienna on 24-25 May, apparently made no significant progress toward finding a basis for cooperation with the EEC or toward strengthening EFTA itself.]

[Although EFTA's next ministerial meeting in October will receive recommendations on both of these issues--to be prepared by the permanent EFTA Council in Geneva--the Vienna discussion pointed up the continuing divergent views. For example, British Prime Minister Wilson was unable to win the approval of all the other members for his specific proposal that the prime ministers of EFTA and EEC countries meet after October.]

[The Swiss, pointing out that the EEC was likely to ignore any suggestions for further contacts at this time, suggested that EFTA should "first put order in its own house," but nevertheless indicated opposition to changing the EFTA convention.]

[Austria, which is currently negotiating for association with the EEC, rejected a Scandinavian proposal which would convert the seven-nation free trade area into a customs union and also rejected a proposed collaboration on agriculture within EFTA. As expected, the Austrians sharply criticized the British import surcharge, and others also expressed hope for its early reduction.]

[These diverse views probably reflect continued uncertainty over British intentions toward EFTA as well as over the prospects of various members for bilateral arrangements with the EEC.]

(continued)

[The inspiration for elevating the Vienna talks to the summit level was Wilson's, and the inconclusive results will scarcely help Britain's sagging leadership in EFTA. Nor do they seem likely to convince British critics of Wilson's European policies that there is much substance to his proposals for establishing a "working unity" between EFTA and the EEC.]

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NOTE

Communist China - Canada: Communist China has just contracted for about 1.6 million tons of grain from Canada, worth about \$100 million. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Prior to this contract, China had bought a total of about 4.5 million tons of grain for delivery this year. Last year China purchased a record total of about 6.5 million tons at a cost of about \$450 million. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 26 May 1965 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

SNIE 11-11-65, "Soviet Attitudes Toward the US"

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

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